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Abstract: 
This study examines the link between minimum wages and health outcomes by using the 
introduction of the National Minimum Wage (NMW) in the United Kingdom in 1999 as an 
exogenous variation of earned income. I test for health effects by using longitudinal data from 
the British Household Panel Survey for a period of ten years. I find that the NMW significantly 
improved several measures of health, including self-reported health status and the presence of 
health conditions. When examining potential mechanisms, I show that changes in health 
behaviors, leisure expenditures and financial stress can explain the observed improvements in 
health. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Previous work has established that low-income families suffer from worse health outcomes 
than wealthier ones (e.g. Case et al., 2002; Deaton, 2002). The World Health Organization states 
that “people further down the social ladder usually run at least twice the risk of serious illness 
and premature death as those near the top” (World Health Organization, 2003). Over the last few 
years, researchers have started examining the effects of governmental assistance programs on 
health outcomes (e.g. Hoynes et al., 2011 and 2015; Milligan and Stabile, 2011). A policy tool 
that is currently receiving much attention by policymakers is the minimum wage. Several 
developed countries (e.g. USA, Germany and the UK) have been discussing changes to 
minimum wage policies in recent years. Only a very small number of papers have so far tested 
for health-related effects of minimum wage policies (Adams et al., 2012; Averett et al., 2016; 
Horn et al., 2016; Lenhart, 2016; Wehby et al, 2016). By using the introduction of the National 
Minimum Wage (NMW) in the UK on April 1, 1999, this paper investigates whether this 
arguably exogenous increase in earned income affected health outcomes of low-wage workers. 
By employing difference-in-difference (DD) models to analyze longitudinal data from the 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for the years 1994-2003, this study examines the effects 
of the reform on a number of health measures. Specifically, I compare the effects on health 
status, health conditions and health care usage between workers whose wages most likely 
increase following the reform and those whose labor income should not be affected by the 
NMW. While the majority of previous work on minimum wages has looked at the effects on 
labor market outcomes, this study adds to the very small recent literature that examines the 
relationship between minimum wages and health-related outcomes. Besides testing for effects on 
a number of health outcomes, the later part of the analysis furthermore explores potential 
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mechanisms underlying the relationship between wages and health by examining the role of the 
reform on health behaviors, leisure activities and financial stress. 
This study finds that the implementation of the NMW provided significant health benefits to 
low-earning individuals who experienced substantial wage increases immediately after the 
implementation. The findings are consistent across several health outcomes and model 
specifications and provide evidence for positive health effects of higher minimum wages. 
Furthermore, I show that the observed health improvements are not driven by changes in hours 
worked. When examining possible channels for the link between wages and health, I find that 
workers increase their spending on leisure activities, are less likely to smoke, more likely to be a 
member in a sports club and less stressed about their financial situations compared to before their 
wage increases. My results suggest that a combination of these factors can explain the observed 
health improvements following the NMW introduction. 
PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
Despite the fact that several studies have previously examined the impact of minimum wages 
on employment and monetary outcomes, there is still significant controversy regarding whether 
or not increasing the minimum wage results in positive economic outcomes.1 While the majority 
of this controversy exists over findings for the US, previous work on the implementation of the 
NMW in the UK has shown no significant employment effects (Stewart, 2004; Dickens and 
Manning, 2004; Connolly and Gregory, 2003) and no effects on hours worked (Connolly and 
Gregory, 2003). Two studies provide evidence that the NMW substantially affected the overall 
wage distribution in the UK leading to a reduction in wage inequality, which was one of the 
                                                          
1 Please see the summary of minimum wage-employment studies by Neumark and Wascher (2007). 
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proclaimed policy goals of the government (Dickens and Manning, 2004; Dolton et al., 2012). 
Butcher et al. (2012) and Arulampalam et al. (2004) furthermore show that the introduction of 
the NMW had spillover effects to workers who previously earned slightly above the new wage 
floor. 
Research interest in examining the relationship between minimum wages and health-related 
outcomes has grown rapidly in recent years. Using the same data set and examining the same 
policy change as this study, two recent papers have examined the effects of the NMW on mental 
health outcomes. Kronenberg et al. (2015) find only small effects, whereas Reeves et al. (2017) 
show that the reform significantly reduced mental illness. Several recent studies have examined 
the association between minimum wage and health in the US. Wehby et al. (2016) find that 
higher minimum wages are associated with increases in birth weight, and note that changes in 
health behavior (prenatal care, smoking during pregnancy) could serve as mechanisms 
explaining the health improvements. Averett et al. (2016) and Horn et al. (2016) find only small 
effects of minimum wages on health, while showing that the effects might differ across 
population groups. Two previous studies provide mixed evidence when examining the 
association between minimum wages and Body Mass Index (Meltzer and Chen, 2011; Cotti and 
Tefft, 2013). Adams et al. (2012) indicate that increased minimum wages are associated with 
higher rates of fatal traffic accidents among drivers under the legal drinking age. Finally, Lenhart 
(2016) finds that within-country increases of minimum wages are associated with improved 
population health outcomes. 
Following early work by Case et al. (2002) who find a highly significant positive association 
between family income and child health in the US, similar results have been found for Canada 
(Currie and Stabile, 2003), England (Currie et al., 2007; Propper et al., 2007, Adda et al., 2009), 
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Australia (Khanam et al., 2009) and Germany (Reinhold and Jürges, 2012). Following these 
finding, the existence of an income gradient in health has been established. More recently, 
researchers have focused on examining health effects of governmental assistance programs for 
lower-income families. Studies have shown that policies such as the Women, Infants and 
Children (WIC) program (Hoynes et al., 2011), the Earned Income Tax Credit (Hoynes et al., 
2015; Evans and Garthwaite, 2014) as well as the Canada Child Tax Benefit (Milligan and 
Stabile, 2011) provide health benefits to vulnerable parts of the population. Fletcher and Wolfe 
(2014) suggest that further expansions in cash transfer programs can help reduce existing health 
inequalities. By examining potential health effects of minimum wages, this paper adds to this 
recently growing area of research. 
BACKGROUND ON MINIMUM WAGE IN THE UK 
In 1909, Winston Churchill, then President of the Board of Trade, established a Wages 
Council system in the UK with the goal of protecting the pay of workers in a number of different 
industries. Despite leading to statutory wage floors in many low-wage sectors of the economy, 
the system never implemented an economy-wide minimum wage. In 1993, John Major’s 
government decided to abolish the Wage Councils, arguing that the system reduces employment 
by raising wages.2 Following a period of six years during which no statutory wage floors existed 
in any sector of the economy besides agriculture, and soon after Tony Blair was elected as Prime 
Minister in May 1997, the Low Pay Commission (LPC) was established.3 Based on the advice of 
the LPC, a first NMW was introduced on April 1st 1999 in the Minimum Wage Act (Low Pay 
Commission, 1998). The wage floor was set at £3.60 per hour for adults, £3.20 per hour for 
                                                          
2 Dickens et al. (1999) provide evidence showing that wage councils had no negative impacts on employment. 
3 The Low Pay Commission is an assembly that consists of nine commissioners which was supposed to serve as an 
independent body that gives the UK government recommendations about a potential minimum wage. 
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adults in the first six months of a job with accredited training and £3.00 per hour for those aged 
18-21.4 Besides attempting to improve minimum standards in the workplace, another goal of the 
reform was to reverse the previous development toward a larger wage inequality in the UK. 
Research has shown that the newly introduced NMW substantially impacted the British labor 
market. The pay of 1.2 million adult jobs increased immediately, which corresponds to 5.4 
percent of workers in the UK (Metcalf, 2008). The average pay increase of affected workers has 
been shown to be between 10-15 percent (Metcalf, 2006). Despite early opposition by the 
Conservative Party based on the fear of increases in unemployment, the NMW has been widely 
perceived as extremely successful over the years. The success of this policy has led to the NMW 
being increased several times since 1999 (Manning, 2013)5. Michael Portillo, who was appointed 
as the new Conservative Leader in 2000, reversed the party’s opposition to the NMW, stating 
that it should not create concerns since “at the modest level at which it has been set by the 
government… The minimum wage has caused less damage to employment than we feared.” 
(Metcalf, 1999). A number of studies have confirmed that the NMW had no negative effects on 
labor market outcomes (Stewart, 2004; Metcalf, 2006; Bryan et al., 2013), while reducing lower 
tail wage inequality (Dolton et al., 2012). 
Besides addressing the issue of wage inequality, a secondary goal of the newly elected 
government was to reduce health inequalities and improve overall population health. However, 
due to the fact that Blair’s cabinet was committed to retain the outgoing Conservative 
government’s expenditure plan, significant changes in healthcare were delayed until the second 
                                                          
4 Hicks and Allen (1999) provide a better understanding of the value of the NMW by showing average prices of 
certain goods: a dozen of new laid eggs (£1.57); 16 ounce of beer in a public bar (£1.73); a gallon of petrol (£2.81). 
5 In a poll of political experts by the Institute of Government, the NMW was voted the most successful UK 
government policy of the past 30 years (Manning, 2013). 
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term of the Labour government, which is after the period of this study. These changes included 
increases in NHS inputs and outputs such as staffing services and healthcare activities. This 
suggests that any observed health improvements as a result of increases in wages should not be 
driven by changes in health services during the time of the study. 
MINIMUM WAGE AND HEALTH 
Minimum wages can affect health through several channels. Rather than being driven by one 
mechanism, it seems more likely that a combination of several factors influences the association 
between minimum wages and health outcomes. In this section, I discuss four potential pathways. 
First, minimum wages can affect health outcomes through changes in health-related 
behavior. This is consistent with the Grossman model of the demand for health (1972), which 
states that individuals inherit an initial stock of health that depreciates over time but can be 
positively influenced through gross investments. These investments in health include factors 
such as lifestyle, exercise, diet and housing. Assuming that health is a normal good, workers will 
increase health inputs as a result of wage increases. Hoynes et al. (2015) point out that, despite 
the fact that the consumption of unhealthy behaviors such as drinking and smoking might 
increase if they are normal goods, unhealthy behaviors will still decrease if the income elasticity 
of health is large enough (Hoynes et al., 2015). Thus the effects of minimum wages on health 
behaviors remain an empirical question. In the later part of this study, I examine whether the 
implementation of the NMW is associated with changes in smoking, drinking, the likelihood of 
being a member of a sports club, leisure expenditures and family vacations. While changes in the 
first three outcomes could potentially directly impact health, changes in leisure expenditures and 
frequency of family vacation could indirectly affect health by influencing overall levels of utility.  
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Second, minimum wages could influence health by affecting financial stress and job-related 
stress as well as the income security of workers, as suggested by Leigh (2013). Early research in 
the medical literature documents the presence of physiological reactions to stress in the form of 
heart diseases and problems with the circulatory system (Sterling and Eyer, 1981; Henry, 1982). 
Reeves et al. (2017) and Horn et al. (2016) provide evidence linking higher minimum wages to 
improvements in mental health. This study examines the role of financial and job-related stress 
by estimating the effects of the NMW on five indicators, which equal to one if respondents 
report to: (1) be in a very difficult financial situation currently; (2) be in a better financial 
position than one year ago; (3) expect his or her financial situation to worsen over the next year; 
(4) be satisfied with his or her job; (5) be satisfied with the payment received at his or her job. 
Third, given that the initial NMW was set at a relatively low level, observed changes in 
health could also be the result of other factors unrelated to the increased wages of affected 
workers. One example of this are increases in overall household income by other members of the 
household. In order to test for this potential channel, the study provides estimates both including 
and excluding a measure of household income that subtracts the labor income of the minimum 
wage worker. If both estimates are similar, this would suggest that the results are robust to 
possible changes in household income from other members of the household. Furthermore, the 
analysis includes controls for marital status, household size and the number of children living in 
the household to account for other potential changes in the worker’s environment. 
Fourth, higher minimum wages could influence worker’s health through its effects on income 
inequality and relative income. Dickens and Manning (2004) and Dolton et al. (2012) provide 
evidence that the NMW was successful in reducing wage inequality in the UK, which was one of 
the main policy goals proclaimed by the government prior to its implementation. Furthermore, 
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previous work in the field of health economics has shown that income inequality can be linked to 
health and overall well-being (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2000; Lynch et al., 2004; Macinko et 
al., 2003; Subramanian and Kawachi, 2004; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2006). The relative income 
hypothesis suggests that reported levels of well-being depends on how individuals compare their 
income level to others around them. In the framework of this study, relative income could affect 
the link between the NMW and health if workers who were earning slightly above the NMW 
before the policy change and subsequently did not receive any raises, report worse health 
outcomes due to the fact that other workers received a boost in earned income. While relative 
income is a potential mechanism underlying the link between minimum wages and health, this 
channel is not examined in this study.  
DATA 
This study uses data from waves four to thirteen (1994 to 2003) of the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS), a nationally representative panel survey of private households in Great 
Britain that started interviewing 10,300 individuals from 5,500 families in 1991.6 For the waves 
used in this study, 95 percent of the interviews were conducted in the months September to 
November, while only 2.4 percent were held in the first three months of the year. Given that the 
NMW was implemented on April 1st 1999, this provides my analysis with five observations both 
before and after the policy change. The use of the BHPS provides several advantages for the 
purpose of this study. Due to it longitudinal nature, the dataset allows accounting for time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity and compositional selection. The potential for measurement 
error in the self-reported health measure is reduced since each individual’s health is only 
                                                          
6 Taylor (1998) provides a full description of the sampling strategy applied in the initial wave in order to design a 
nationally representative sample of the British population. 
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compared to their own prior assessment, while controlling for the fact that each respondent may 
have their own scales in ranking their health (reference bias). Furthermore, in comparison to the 
two other commonly used UK datasets with detailed information on earnings (Labor Force 
Survey and New Earnings Survey), the BHPS also provides information on several health 
outcomes. Finally, the BHPS gives a complete representation of incomes across the pay 
distribution since it questions all individuals above 15 years of age who live in the household at 
the time of the interview. 
The main health outcome that this study analyzes is self-reported health status, but it also 
looks at additional health measures, which could potentially be viewed as more objective. Self-
reported health status is categorized from one (=excellent) to five (=very poor) in the BHPS. It 
has been widely used in previous studies regarding the relationship between income and health 
(e.g. Case et al., 2002; Currie and Stabile, 2003; Adda et al., 2009). Furthermore, self-reported 
health has been shown to be a good predictor of other health outcomes, including mortality (Idler 
and Benyamini, 1997), future health care usage (van Doorslaer et al., 2000) and hospitalizations 
(Nielsen et al., 2016).  
In order to remove concerns about reporting heterogeneity of health status, Johnson et al. 
(2009) suggests to additionally examine health outcomes which are viewed as more objective 
(Johnston et al., 2009). This study tests for the effects of the NMW on the presence of 13 types 
of health conditions, which are reported in the BHPS. In order to further examine the role of 
wage increases on health, I test for the effects of the NMW on three groups of health conditions: 
(1) any condition; (2) conditions that workers could treat themselves using their additional labor 
income to purchase over-the-counter medications; (3) long-term/chronic conditions that should 
not be affected by having more money in the short-run. Despite the fact that the NHS provides 
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universal health insurance coverage, issues like quality of care as well as long waiting times were 
prevalent at the time of the study (Vizard and Obolenskaya, 2013). In order to avoid long waiting 
times, individuals in the UK can purchase a relatively small number of medications, which are 
placed on the General Sales List, at pharmacies without any prescription.7 Finding a decrease in 
the presence of the second group of conditions after the reform could thus provide additional 
evidence for effects on health, whereas examining short-run changes in the presence of long-term 
conditions serves as a falsification test.  
Additionally, the study examines whether the policy impacted the frequency of doctor and 
overnight hospital stays as well as the use of other health services (e.g. physiotherapist, 
psychotherapist, health visitor at home) within the last 12 months. Observing decreases in these 
three measures of health care can provide further evidence for improvements in health since 
healthier people need to see the doctor less often. 
Given that individuals in the UK become eligible to receive state pensions at the age of 65, 
the sample is restricted to workers below the age of 65. A disadvantage of the BHPS is the 
relatively small sample size. Nevertheless, since the BHPS allows following the same workers 
over time as well as testing for health effects on workers who are directly affected by the reform, 
its benefits outweigh the issue of a relatively small sample size. 
ECONOMETRIC METHODS 
Difference-in-Differences Models 
                                                          
7 Examples of medications on the General Sales List are painkillers, skin creams, anti-allergy tablets, hearing aids, 
eye drops as well as non-prescription glasses. Thus, I group the following conditions as potentially treatable by 
additional income: body pain, skin condition/allergy as well as problems with either hearing or eye sight. 
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This study employs a difference-in-differences (DD) model to test for the average 
treatment effects of the reform on treated workers. The model follows the approach used by 
Stewart and Swaffield (2002), Aralampalam et al. (2004), Kronenberg et al. (2015), and Reeves 
et al. (2017) and constructs an hourly wage measure for the pre-treatment period by using 
reported monthly labor income and hours worked per week.8 The sample is restricted to low-
wage workers in this specification. The treatment group consists of hourly paid workers whose 
wages are below the NMW prior to the policy, whereas hourly paid workers earning between the 
NMW and £6.00 in the year before the policy change form the control group.9 This selection into 
groups provides the analysis with 262 treated workers and 675 workers in the control group. Like 
the previous papers using this identification approach, this study is unable to use actual self-
reported wage information to examine the effects of the policy change since this variable was 
only introduced to the BHPS after the reform in 1999. 
The main DD equation estimated in this study is the following: 
Yit = β0  + + δDD Postit*Treatit +  β1 Xit +  λ1 Areait + λ2 Yearit  + λ3 Monthit  + αi + εit ,    (1) 
where Yit represents self-reported health status in the main specification; Treatit equals one if an 
individual belongs to the treatment group; and Post is an indicator for the post-treatment period 
(after April 1st, 1999)10. Since the dependent variable is categorized from 1 (=excellent) to 5 
(=very poor), ordered logit estimation is conducted in order to observe impacts of the reform 
                                                          
8 The BHPS only introduced actual hourly wage information to the survey in 1999. In an additional specification, I 
use actual hourly wage data to separate individuals into treatment and control group (see section 5.2). 
9 The study accounts for the lower NMW for workers between the ages of 18 and 21. 
10 Less than 3 percent of respondents were interviewed in the first three months of 1999. In the main model, these 
observations belong to the pre-treatment period. In an additional model, I find that the results remain unchanged 
when excluding these individuals to control for potential changes in responses due to anticipation of the policy 
change. These results are not shown, but are available upon request. 
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across the distribution of health status. For the other health-related outcomes, linear probability 
models are estimated to test for the effects of the policy on health condition, doctor visits, 
overnight hospital stays and the use of other health services. In order to examine the effects on 
labor market outcomes, I also re-estimate equation (1) with monthly personal labor income and 
hours worked per week as the dependent variables. δDD, which represents the effect of the policy 
change on health outcomes, is the main parameter of interest. Xit represents a set of time-varying 
individual and household characteristics that are controlled for in the analysis. These include 
marital status, household size, number of children in the household and, in additional 
specifications, the amount of income by other members of the household. Equation (1) also 
includes dummy variables for region, year and month of the interview. The inclusion of αi 
captures unobserved individual heterogeneity and accounts for potential omitted variable bias. 
Additional Models 
The previously described main DD analysis uses calculated hourly wages to assign 
workers into treatment and control group. This selection process does not rule out that some 
workers in the treatment group are potentially not affected by the NMW implementation due to 
potential measurement errors in reported wages or due to poor enforcement of the new wage 
floor.11 Thus, the main estimates provide intent-to-treat effects. Furthermore, the main DD setup 
might ignore that the policy change may have raised of some individuals in the control group 
who earned slightly above the NMW, as suggested by Butcher et al. (2012) and Arulampalam et 
al. (2004). The presence of these spillover effects would suggest that the main DD estimates are 
                                                          
11 Metcalf (2006) provides evidence that compliance with the NMW was very good in the early years after its 
implementation until 2002. 
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under-estimated. This section introduces seven additional specifications that are estimated to 
further check for the robustness of the findings from the main model. 
First, in order to take into account potential spillover effects, I redefine the treatment 
group as workers earning up to 1.1 times, 1.2 times and 1.3 times the NMW. Due to the 
increased sample size for the treatment group in these specifications, the control group includes 
all other workers who earn up to 200 percent of the NMW. Second, I conduct two types of 
placebo tests to further increase the credibility of the main results (Bertrand et al., 2004): a) a 
placebo treatment, which compare the effects of health outcomes between workers between two 
groups of workers whose wages should not have been affected by the NMW. The treatment 
group consists of hourly paid individuals earning between 200 to 300 percent of the NMW, while 
those making more than 300 percent of the NMW form the control group; b) a temporal placebo, 
which moves the implementation of the NWM one year ahead to April 1st, 1998. Finding no 
statistically significant results for these models would provide suggestive evidence that the 
parallel path assumption of the main DD analysis is satisfied for the year 1999.  
Third, I test for the effects of wage increases on health when loosening the assumption of 
a linear relationship between income and health. Abadie (2005) introduced a semiparametric 
two-step method of capturing average treatment effects for the treated (ATT) for the case that 
differences in observed characteristics create non-parallel outcome dynamics between the two 
observed groups, which violates the main assumption of standard DD models. The ATT is given 
by the following equation: 
𝐸[𝑌1(1) − 𝑌0(1) |𝐷 = 1]  =    𝐸  [  
𝑌(1) − 𝑌(0)
𝑃 (𝐷 = 1)
∗  
𝐷 − 𝑃(𝐷 = 1 |𝑋)
1 − 𝑃 (𝐷 = 1 |𝑋)
  ]    ,      (2) 
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where Y(1) and Y(0) represent health outcomes before and after the treatment, D is an indicator 
for belonging to the treatment group, P(D=1) gives the probability of receiving treatment and 
P(D=1 | X) is the propensity score which equals the probability of treatment, conditional on 
observed covariates X. The semiparametric estimator is obtained through two steps: (1) 
estimation of the propensity score and computation of fitted values for the sample; (2) plugging 
in the fitted values into the sample analogue of equation (2). Abadie (2005) shows that weighted 
average differences in the outcome of interest can recover estimates for treatment effects on the 
treated, whereas the weights depend on the propensity score and the same distribution of 
covariates is imposed for both treatment and control group. 
Fourth, I estimate a specification in which the treatment group is defined based on who is 
actually “treated” rather than on a potential treatment sample. The BHPS added the following 
question to the survey in 1999: “Has your pay or hourly rate in your current job been increased to 
bring you up to the National Minimum Wage or has it remained the same?” Individuals who 
respond with ‘yes’ are selected into the treatment group. In order to account for potential 
spillover effects, I furthermore include workers who earned slightly above the NWM before the 
reform who report having received a raise immediately after the reform in the treatment group. 
Specifically, those who received a raise while still earning less than £5.00 in 2000 are considered 
as treated.12 The control group for this model is comprised of hourly paid workers who did not 
report experiencing an increase in wages immediately after the policy change. Since the 
estimates obtained from this specification are closer to the treatment-on-the-treated effects, we 
would the effects on health to be larger for this specification. 
                                                          
12 I have repeated the analysis with different thresholds and the results remain unchanged. Due to a relatively large 
number of missing responses, only 38 percent of the initial treatment group reported receiving a raise after the 
NMW implementation. Only 22 percent of them mentioned that their raise was a direct result of the policy change. 
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Fifth, in order to account for potentially different trends between the two groups during 
period of interest, I re-estimate an alternative DD model based on Mora and Reggio (2015). In 
their paper, they introduce a DD estimator that identifies policy effects using a fully flexible 
dynamic specification as well as a number of “parallel growth” assumptions to test for the 
robustness baseline DD findings. Sixth, I use fixed salary workers who are financially unaffected 
by the NMW implementation as the control group and compare health outcomes between them 
and the initial treatment group of low-wage workers who received raises. This specification can 
provide additional evidence for whether the results of the main specification are robust to the 
choice of the control group.  
Finally, while the NHS provides universal insurance coverage to all individuals in the UK, 
people additionally have the option to purchase supplemental private coverage. The main 
estimates showing health improvements from the NMW implementation could be biased if 
changes to this supplemental coverage occurred that differentially affected members of the 
treatment and the control group. I estimate two additional specifications to check for this 
potential concern: 1) I re-estimate equation (1) using an indicator whether respondents have 
supplemental private insurance as the outcome variable; (2) I re-estimate the main DD model for 
the effects of the NMW on health status including private coverage as a control variable. Despite 
private insurance potentially being an endogenous control, this specification can provide 
evidence whether the main results are driven by shifts in insurance coverage. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Basic descriptive statistics for the entire sample are given in Table 1. Individuals earn an 
average monthly labor income of £834.25 report an average health status of 2.12 on a scale from 
17 
 
one (excellent) to five (very poor). Table 2 presents separate summary statistics for the main 
treatment group of the sample as well as for the main control group of the analysis for the year 
prior to the NMW implementation (1998). Individuals from both groups are similar regarding 
most characteristics before the policy change. Given that the assignment into the groups is based 
on wages prior to the policy change, it is not surprising that average personal monthly labor 
income of treated people is lower than that of individuals belonging to the control group 
(£543.59 vs. £876.57). The statistics furthermore show that the share of women is larger in the 
treatment group, which is consistent with findings by Stewart and Swaffield (2002). 73.2 percent 
of treated workers and 78.5 percent of workers in the control group report being in excellent or 
very good health in 1998, respectively (statistically different at 10 percent level). Table 3 shows 
sample statistics for health conditions in the first year of the study. Panel A provides the share of 
individuals who report suffering from the 13 health conditions for each group. Treated 
individuals are 8.5 percentage points more likely to suffer from any health condition, whereas the 
shares for the two groups are relatively comparable across all conditions. 
Figure 1 displays how real hourly wages of workers in the sample changed during the 
years of the study. Consistent with the selection of treatment and control group, it is observable 
that individuals in the control group earn higher wages than those in the treatment group. 
However, Figure 1 shows that the wage gap between the two groups narrowed immediately after 
the implementation of the NMW, providing suggestive evidence that the reform offers an 
arguably exogenous increase in wages that allows testing for potential effects on health 
outcomes. Figure 2 shows changes in the likelihood of respondents from both groups to report 
excellent health status. While treated workers appear to be substantially less likely to report this 
top category prior to 1999, the gap again narrows after the NMW introduction. In 2001, 
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respondent from both group are equally likely to report excellent health. The gap widens again in 
the last two years of the sample period, but remains smaller than in the pre-treatment period. 
RESULTS 
Effect of the Policy on Labor Market Outcomes 
Before examining the effects of the minimum wage implementation on health outcomes, 
Table 4 provides evidence for the effects of the policy change on earned income and on hours 
worked. This can provide evidence for the magnitude of changes in wages experienced by 
treated workers and for whether workers and employers responded to the NMW implementation 
by changing the number of hours they work. Panel A shows descriptive statistics for monthly 
personal labor income earned and weekly hours worked for the year before and after the policy 
change. Panel B presents two DD estimates for each outcome that are obtained when excluding 
and including control variables into the model. The results from the model with controls suggest 
that monthly income of treated workers increased by £44 ($66 using the year 2000 conversion 
rate), which corresponds to annual pay raises of £528 ($792). The DD estimate for the effects of 
the NMW on hours worked that the policy change did not affect time spent at work. Both 
findings for earned income (Metcalf, 2006 and 2008; Butcher, 2005) and hours worked 
(Connolly and Gregory, 2003) are consistent with previous results in the literature. 
Effects of the Policy on Health Status 
Table 5 shows the ordered logit results for average treatment effects of the NMW 
introduction on the health status of affected workers. The estimates show that the NMW 
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significantly improves self-reported health status of workers. 13 Column (1) of Panel A shows 
that the policy change increased the likelihood of being in excellent health by 3.04 percentage 
points (p<0.05). Consistent with this, workers are significantly less likely to report being in fair, 
poor or very poor health after the reform (p<0.05). The observed impacts for the various 
categories of health status correspond to percentage changes of up to 18.7 percent from the pre-
treatment period. The magnitude and statistical significance of these findings provide evidence 
for the presence of positive health effects as a result of an increase in minimum wages.14 The 
estimates for other control variables included in the analysis show that they play a very little role 
in explaining changes in health following the policy change. One explanation for this could be 
that there are relatively small variation in the observable characteristics within individuals during 
the sample period. In Panel B, I add a control for income earned by other members of the 
household. While the estimate suggests that other income has a positive effect on self-reported 
health, including it in the model does not change the DD estimate for the effect of the NMW on 
health status. 
Additional Health Outcomes 
Next, I further investigate the effects of the reform on other health outcomes, which are 
potentially more objective.15 Based on the classification of health conditions shown in Table 3, 
DD estimates for several categories are presented in Table 6. The first column indicates that 
receiving a raise through the NMW implementation reduces the likelihood of suffering from at 
least one of the 13 health conditions listed in the BHPS by 3.76 percentage points (p<0.10), 
                                                          
13 Since the share of individuals reporting to be in very poor health is quite small (< 1 percent), the bottom two 
health responses (poor and very poor) are combined to one outcome leaving the analysis with four health categories. 
14 The results remain consistent when estimating linear models. These results are available upon request. 
15 I find that individuals who are in excellent/very good health are significantly less likely to both suffer from health 
conditions and to use health services frequently, which confirms that these measures are proxies of overall health. 
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which corresponds to a 7 percent change compared to the pre-reform period. The estimate for 
other household income in column (1) implies that higher income earned by other members of 
the household reduces the likelihood of reporting the presence of a health condition. Column (2) 
shows that this decline in health conditions is mainly driven by reductions in health conditions 
that could have potentially been taken care of by purchasing over-the-counter medications (body 
pain, skin problems/allergy, and hearing or sight issues). This finding suggests that medications 
for self-treatment are a normal good and changes in consumption can potentially explain health 
improvements when the budget constraint is relaxed. Column (3) shows that the NMW had no 
effect on the presence of long-term/chronic health conditions, such as asthma and epilepsy, 
which require more serious and long-term treatments. While the finding in Table 6 provide 
suggestive evidence supporting that the NMW implementation improved health, the results 
should be treated with caution due to the lack of precision in the estimates. 
Table 7 presents the effects of the policy change on several measures of health care 
usage. The estimates in Panel A show that the NMW implementation is associated with a 4.15 
percentage point increase in the likelihood of workers having no annual doctor visits (p<0.05), 
which corresponds to a change of 20.2 percent from the pre-treatment period. Treated workers 
are 2.02 and 2.51 percentage point less likely to see a doctor between three to five and more than 
five times per year, respectively (both p<0.05). Panel B of Table 7 furthermore shows that the 
policy change reduced the use of any health services by 5.42 percentage points (p<0.05). Given 
that the provision of health care in the UK is mainly financed by taxes with relative low copays 
for prescription medications, findings of less doctor visits and reduced use of other health 
services can be regarded as additional evidence for health improvements. Additionally, Panel B 
shows that the NMW implementation led to a 2.18 percentage point reduction in the likelihood 
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of staying in a hospital overnight. The lack of significance for this estimate could be due to a 
combination of the following factors: an inelastic demand for hospital stays, that NHS-provided 
insurance covers all people in emergencies regardless of income, and the small share of 
respondents who report to have stayed in a hospital overnight during the period of interest. 
Heterogeneous Health Effects 
Next, I examine whether the NMW implementation had heterogeneous treatment effects on 
health status across several subgroups of the sample. Specifically, I test for differences across 
gender, education level, marital status and age. Panel A of Table 8 shows that the previously 
observed health improvements of the NMW are almost entirely experienced by male workers 
who are likely to benefit from the reform (p<0.01). A possible explanation for these differences 
by gender are different income effects of the NMW for men and women. My analysis find that 
the increase in annual labor income of male workers as a result of the policy change is more than 
£500 larger than the increase experienced by female workers. 
The estimates in Panel B suggest that health benefits of the NMW are larger for treated 
individuals with higher levels of education, who are 4.81 percentage points more likely to be in 
excellent health (p<0.10). This finding appears surprising since lower-educated individuals seem 
to be more likely to earn wages below the NMW and thus see their earned income increase 
following the policy change. However, this assumption does not seem to hold in my sample, 
where only relatively small differences in the share of workers with at most an O-level education 
are observable between treatment (61.0 percent) and control group (55.8 percent). While all 
individuals in the sample receive low wages around the NMW, differences in the types of jobs 
are observable between respondents with different levels of education. Compared to people with 
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at most an O-level education, individuals with at least an A-level education are more likely to be 
in managerial/technical occupations (32.42 vs. 21.91 percent), while less likely to work in partly 
skilled (24.84 vs. 17.29 percent) and unskilled occupations (3.64 vs. 7.95 percent). Additionally, 
the observed differences in health effects between the two groups can potentially be explained by 
differences in hours worked (higher educated individuals work 2.20 hours more per week) and 
gender (the share of females is 5.1 percent higher for the lower educated sample). 
Furthermore, Panel C and D provide suggestive evidence that the effects of the NMW on 
health are larger for unmarried and younger workers (both p<0.05). Similar to the differences by 
gender, a likely explanation for the different effects by age is the fact that the policy led to 
slightly larger income increases for individuals below 40 years of age. The findings potentially 
suggest that changes in health behaviors such as smoking or exercising might provide larger 
health benefits to younger individuals. Overall, despite potential statistical power limitations in 
the analysis, the results in Table 8 provide evidence that the NMW had differential effects on 
health across the population. 
MECHANISMS 
Table 9 shows the results for the role of health behavior and leisure expenditures as potential 
channels underlying the link between higher wages and health outcomes. Column (1) shows that 
the implementation of the NMW reduced smoking by 2.51 percentage points (p<0.05), 
suggesting that smoking might be an inferior good for low-wage workers in the UK. This result 
is consistent with recent findings by Wehby et al. (2016). Columns (2) and (3) show that the 
NMW reduced the likelihood with which workers drink at least once per week and increased 
memberships in sport clubs (p<0.10). Both estimates provide additional evidence that changes in 
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health behaviors can explain the observed health improvements following the policy change to 
some extent. When examining changes in leisure expenditures, I find that households with 
treated workers are more likely to spend at least £80 per week on leisure (p<0.05) and to go on a 
family vacation of at least one week (p<0.10) after the NMW implementation. Following the 
assumption that these two activities increases satisfaction, these changes could be viewed as 
potential channels that impact health by affecting the worker’s well-being. 
Table 10 presents estimates for the effects of the NMW on financial and job-related stress. 
Column (1) shows that perceived financial well-being improved significantly for affected 
workers. Treated individuals are 4.16 percentage points less likely to view their current financial 
situation as very difficult after the reform (p<0.05). Despite being estimating imprecisely, the 
estimates in Columns (2) and (3) provide additional suggestive evidence for reductions in 
financial stress by showing that treated workers are more likely to feel that their financial 
situation has improved compared to the previous year and less likely to expect their financial 
situation to worsen in the upcoming year, respectively. The final two columns show that the 
NMW improved overall job satisfaction and satisfaction with the pay being received for workers 
in the treatment group (6.26 and 5.02 percentage points, respectively; both p<0.05). 
The findings in Tables 9 and 10 suggest that there is not a single channel through which 
minimum wages influence health outcomes. It appears that a combination of factors such as 
health-related behavior, leisure expenditures financial and job-related stress, can be explain the 
positive link between higher minimum wages and health observed in this study. 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
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Table 11 provides several tests to the robustness of the previously presented main findings of 
the study. Panel A redefines the groups of the DD analysis in order to account for potential 
spillover effect of the NMW implementation. Using three different cutoffs for the treatment 
group (1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 times the NMW), I find that, although slightly smaller in magnitude, the 
estimates remain consistent to those shown in Table 5. This suggests that the main findings are 
robust towards potential spillover effects of the policy on workers who earned slightly above the 
NMW prior to the reform. 
Next, I conduct two type of placebo tests to provide additional credibility to the findings of 
the paper. The first row in Panel B shows DD estimates using a temporal placebo treatment by 
moving the date of the policy change one year ahead to April 1, 1998. The results indicate slight 
improvements in health, however, the estimates are statistically insignificant.16 In the second 
placebo test, I compare changes in health status between two groups of workers that should not 
have been affected by the NMW, those earning 200-300 percent of the NMW (treatment group) 
and those earning above 300 percent of the NMW (control group). Again, the estimates are 
imprecisely estimated, suggesting that there were no differences in health between the two 
groups. Both placebo tests provide further robustness to the main DD estimates of the study. 
Furthermore, the results from the temporal placebo treatment provide suggestive evidence that 
the parallel path assumption of the baseline DD specification is satisfied.17 
                                                          
16 When using the placebo analyses to conduct the role of changes in health behaviors and leisure expenditures, I 
find that the estimates for all outcomes shown in Table 9 are smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant. 
These results are not shown in the paper, but are available upon request. 
17 Placebo estimates for other health outcomes (health conditions and use of health services) and mechanisms (e.g. 
smoking and drinking) are also statistically insignificant. These results are not shown in the paper, but are available 
upon request. 
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Panel C presents estimates obtained from using selection into treatment and control group 
based on responses of whether workers experienced a wage increase immediately following the 
policy change. Compared to the main results of Table 5, these estimates are larger in magnitude, 
which is consistent with the fact that this specification is able to obtain results that are closer to 
the treatment-on-the-treated-effects, rather than the intent-to-treat effects. Treated individuals are 
5.88 percentage points more likely to report excellent health (p<0.01) and 2.15 percentage points 
less likely to report poor or very poor health (p<0.01). In an additional check to the robustness of 
the group selection of the main analysis, I use financially unaffected salary workers as the 
control group. The results in Panel D are consistent with the previous findings showing that 
treated workers report higher levels of health status following their raises (p<0.05).  
Panel E and F provide estimates for four outcomes using two alternative DD models. First, I 
test for the effects of the reform by estimating Abadie’s (2005) semiparametric DD model, which 
loosens the assumption of a linear relationship between income and health (Panel E). The results 
for health status are consistent with the main DD estimates (p<0.01), providing suggestive 
evidence that the impact of the NMW on those treated is similar to the impact on those the policy 
was intended to impact. One potential explanation for the similarity of the effects on health 
between the parametric and semi-parametric model is that the control variables in the main 
model do not significantly affect health status and excluding them would not generate any major 
bias to the estimates. Thus, whether one controls for them in a parametric or in a semi-parametric 
way should not be relevant. As shown in Panel E, the semiparametric DD analysis also provides 
evidence that for reductions in financial stress following the policy change. The negative effect 
of the NMW on smoking, however, is smaller and imprecisely estimated compared to the main 
DD analysis.  
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The estimates obtained by using Mora and Reggio’s (2015) alternative DD model that allows 
testing for the parallel paths assumption are presented in Panel F. The effects on the likelihood of 
being in excellent or very good health is larger in magnitude than the main DD model. Treated 
workers are 6.10 percentage points more likely to report the top two categories of health status 
(p<0.01). Furthermore, this alternative DD specification provides evidence for reductions in 
financial stress (p<0.10) and smoking. Despite only being slightly smaller than the main DD 
effect for smoking in Table 9, the alternative DD result is imprecisely estimated due to increased 
standard errors. This could suggest that the magnitude and level of significance of the main 
estimate for the effect of the NMW on smoking (p<0.05) could to some extent be explained by a 
lack of parallel paths for this outcome. 
Finally, Table 12 shows estimates for the effects of the NMW on supplemental private 
insurance coverage and on health status when including a control for private insurance coverage. 
This analysis can provide evidence whether the main estimates of the study are potentially driven 
by differential changes in supplemental private insurance coverage between workers in the 
treatment and the control group. The estimates remove concerns that the main analysis might be 
biased due to changes in insurance coverage. Panel A shows that treated workers are less likely 
to have private coverage following the policy change, while the estimate is statistically 
significant. Furthermore, compared to the estimates in Table 5, the effects on health status are 
even larger in magnitude when controlling for private coverage (p<0.01). An explanation for 
why supplemental private insurance does not affect the findings of the study could the relatively 
high costs of the coverage since the sample consists of low-wage workers. Emmerson et al. 
(2001) show that, between 1995 and 1999, 41.2 percent of people in the richest 10 percent of the 
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population were privately insured in the UK, whereas only 3.7 percent of people in the bottom 40 
percent of the income distribution had private coverage.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Although the main goal of the NMW implementation of the NMW by the British 
Government was to protect the pay of workers and to counter previous trends towards larger 
income inequality, this paper points out that the reform also provided non-monetary benefits. A 
complete evaluation minimum wage policy changes should consider evaluating all potential 
outcomes. Due to the popularity of the NMW, the UK wage floor has been increased several 
times since its initial introduction in 1999. Most recently, First Secretary of State George 
Osborne announced the introduction of the National Living Wage (NLW), which would 
significantly increase wages of low-income workers in the UK (Watt and Stewart, 2015). 
According to Osborne, the governments’ goal is to increase the NLW to 60 percent of median 
earnings by 2020, while decreasing working-age benefits. Given the findings of this study, 
potential health benefits of higher wage floors should be considered by policymakers. 
Changes to both federal and state minimum wages have been debated intensely in recent 
decades in the US as well as in other developed and developing countries, which underscores the 
relevance on studying the effects of such law changes. Only recently, President Obama proposed 
an increase of the federal minimum wage from $7.25 to $10.10. After the last national elections 
in Germany in September 2013, the potential introduction of a federal wage floor was one of the 
first policies to be discussed and to be passed by the new administration. The findings of this 
study suggest that minimum wage laws are capable of reducing existing health inequalities in 
society, a result that is desirable by both individuals and governments. The results suggests that 
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higher minimum wages can impact health outcomes through a number of different channels. 
Future research should continue to examine the pathways through which minimum wages and 
other income support programs affect the well-being of low-income individuals. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max N 
      
Age 38.56 12.24 18 64 9,299 
      
Male (%) 0.359 0.480 0 1 9,299 
      
Married (%) 0.586 0.492 0 1 9,299 
      
# Children in HH 0.498 0.852 0 4 9,299 
      
Household Size 3.054 1.168 1 7 9,299 
      
A-Levels (%) 0.126 0.332 0 1 9,299 
      
O-Levels (%) 0.240 0.427 0 1 9,299 
      
Monthly Net Income £834.25 £503.79 0 £7,256.83 9,299 
      
Health Status (1=excellent, 5=very poor) 2.12 0.84 1 5 9,299 
      
Any Health Condition (%) 0.536 0.500 0 1 4,430 
      
Private Insurance (%) 0.110 0.313 0 1 7,280 
      
Current Smoker (%) 0.313 0.464 0 1 9,299 
      
Completely Satisfied with Job (%) 0.133 0.339 0 1 5,653 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics Pre-Treatment by Groups (1998): 
Variables    Treatment Group               Control Group 
Income    
Personal Income/Month   £543.59*** (216.69)       £876.57*** (293.38) 
Household Income/Month £2,181.34*** (1,128.30)       £2,414.31*** (1,179.80) 
    
Health:     
% Excellent/Very Good   0.732* (0.444)      0.785*  (0.411) 
% Poor/Very Poor 0.073 (0.260)   0.048 (0.214) 
% Health Condition     0.602** (0.491)       0.517** (0.500) 
% Doctor > 5 times last year 0.134 (0.341)   0.127 (0.333) 
% Hospital In-Patient last year 0.054 (0.226)   0.061 (0.240) 
 
Education     
% A-Levels 0.146 (0.353)  0.136 (0.343) 
% O-Levels   0.195* (0.419)    0.256* (0.437) 
% Higher Education               0.255 (0.437)  0.294 (0.456) 
      
Marital Status    
% Married 0.544 (0.499)  0.599 (0.490) 
% Divorced 0.046 (0.210)  0.043 (0.204) 
% Never Married 0.253 (0.435)  0.208 (0.406) 
    
Age 37.82 (13.03)   37.90 (11.27) 
    
% Male       0.268*** (0.444)         0.392*** (0.488) 
       
# of Children in HH               0.272*** (0.644)                0.592*** (0.909) 
       
Household Size               2.989 (1.132)                3.117 (1.207) 
      
% Private Insurance       0.031*** (0.174)        0.093*** (0.290) 
      
% Saving any       0.398*** (0.491)        0.498*** (0.500) 
      
               Observations:                      262                           675 
Notes: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses, whereas tests of the null hypothesis whether the statistics for the two groups 
are the same are indicated by stars. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics on Health Conditions Pre-Treatment (1998): 
Conditions Treatment Group Control Group 
Panel A: All Conditions    
Any     0.602** (0.491)    0.517** (0.500) 
     
Body Pain / Problems 0.245 (0.431)                0.202 (0.402) 
     
Migraine 0.130 (0.337)                0.102 (0.302) 
     
Skin / Allergy 0.165 (0.372) 0.139 (0.346) 
     
Asthma / Chest / Breathing 0.111 (0.315) 0.099 (0.298) 
     
Anxiety / Depression 0.061 (0.240) 0.051 (0.220) 
     
Heart / Blood Pressure 0.103 (0.305) 0.073 (0.261) 
     
Hearing 0.038 (0.192) 0.037 (0.190) 
     
Stomach / Liver / Kidney 0.069 (0.254) 0.045 (0.207) 
     
Seeing      0.038*** (0.192)       0.012*** (0.109) 
     
Epilepsy 0.008 (0.087) 0.004 (0.067) 
     
Diabetes 0.015 (0.123) 0.010 (0.102) 
     
Alcohol / Drugs 0.004 (0.062) 0.000 (0.000) 
     
Other  0.046 (0.210)                0.037 (0.190) 
     
Observations 262 675 
     
Panel B: Groups of Conditions "Treatable" Conditions Long-Term Conditions 
  Body Pain / Problems Asthma / Chest / Breathing 
  Skin / Allergy Epilepsy 
  Hearing   
  Seeing   
      
Treatment Group   0.398* (0.491) 0.184 (0.388) 
Control Group   0.336 *(0.473) 0.142 (0.349) 
Notes: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses, whereas tests of the null hypothesis whether the statistics for the two groups 
are the same are indicated by stars. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Figure 1: Changes in Real Hourly Wages 
 
Notes: The wages shown are deflated to 2000 Pounds using the UK Average Earnings Index. Generated hourly wages 
are calculated based on the reported number of hours worked per week and the self-reported personal monthly  
income for the last payment period.  
 
 
Figure 2: Changes in the Share of Individuals in Excellent Health 
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Table 4: The Effects of the Policy on Income and Hours Worked: 
  Monthly Income  Hours Worked per Week 
     
 
   
Panel A: Descriptive 
Statistics 
Treatment 
Group 
Control 
Group 
 Treatment 
Group 
Control 
Group 
     
 
   
1998 605.68 1,030.86  26.63 32.21 
  (338.13) (590.22)  (12.48) (11.47) 
1999 681.57 1,055.48  26.02 31.97 
  (334.06) (573.68)  (12.30) (11.78) 
      
      
Panel B: DD Estimate    50.93*** 44.00***  0.21 0.15 
 (16.14) (15.81)  (0.43) (0.41) 
      
Policy Effect 7.36% 6.35%  0.68% 0.49% 
Control Variables No Yes  No Yes 
      
Observations 9,299 9,299  4,469 4,469 
Notes: For the descriptive statistics in Panel A, standard deviation are shown in parentheses, while robust standard errors are  
reported in parentheses for the DD estimates in Panel B. The control variables include information on household size,  
the number of children and marital status.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5: The Effects of the Policy on Health Status 
  Marginal Effects 
  Excellent Very Good Fair Poor/Very Poor 
 Panel A: Baseline      
Post*Treat    0.0304**   0.0049*    -0.0251**    -0.0104*** 
  (0.0150) (0.0027) (0.0124) (0.0050)  
     
Policy Effect 17.67% 0.89% 11.53% 18.71% 
     
HH Size -0.0027 -0.0004 0.0022 0.0009 
  (0.0067) (0.0010) (0.0054)    (0.0022)  
# of Kids 0.0150 0.0024 -0.0124 -0.0050 
  (0.0104) (0.0017) (0.0086)  (0.0035) 
Divorced      -0.0281         -0.0044        0.0231           0.0094 
      (0.0412)         (0.0067)       (0.0340)          (0.0138) 
Never Married       0.0191          0.0030        -0.0157          -0.0064 
      (0.0219)          (0.0036)        (0.0181)          (0.0074) 
     
     
Panel B: Additional 
Control     
Post*Treat    0.0307**   0.0049*    -0.0253**    -0.0103*** 
  (0.0151) (0.0027) (0.0124) (0.0050)  
     
Policy Effect 17.85% 0.89% 11.62% 18.69% 
     
Other Income     0.0164***    0.0026**      -0.0135***     -0.0055*** 
  (0.0046) (0.0011) (0.0038) (0.0016)  
     
Observations 9,299 9,299 9,299 9,299 
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by individuals, are shown in parentheses. The excluded category for marital status is 
married. The models in Panel B include all other control variables listed in Panel A. Other income is a measure for household 
income that is created by subtracting the respondents’ income from the total income of the household. The estimate show the 
effect of an increase in other income by £1,000. Furthermore, region, year and month dummy variables are included in all 
models. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 6: The Effects of the Policy on Health Conditions: 
  Types of Health Conditions 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Any 
Treatable by over-the-
counter medications 
Long-Term / Chronic 
Post*Treat  -0.0376*  -0.0353* 0.0012 
  (0.0218) (0.0206) (0.0115) 
    
Policy Effect 7.04% 11.17% 0.01% 
    
HH Size 0.0184 0.0216  -0.0097* 
  (0.0141) (0.0137) (0.0055) 
# of Children -0.0303    -0.0439** -0.0040 
  (0.0199) (0.0187) (0.0098) 
Divorced -0.0276     -0.1113**  0.0483 
 (0.0733) (0.0636) (0.0405) 
Never Married -0.0082 -0.0033 -0.0397 
 (0.0589) (0.0587) (0.0317) 
Other Income    -0.0175** -0.0086 0.0004 
 (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0031) 
    
Observations 4,430 4,430 4,430 
Notes: The division of health conditions is based on the categorization in Table 3 and is based on the author’s opinion. Robust  
standard errors, clustered by individuals, are shown in parentheses. The excluded category for marital status is married. Other 
income is a measure for household income that is created by subtracting the respondents’ income from the total income of the 
household. The estimate show the effect of an increase in other income by £1,000. Furthermore, region, year and month dummy 
variables are included in all models. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 7: The Effects of the Policy on Health Care Usage: 
 Panel A: 
Doctor Visits 
Number of Doctor Visits Last Year 
 None 1-2 3-5 >5 
Post*Treat    0.0415** -0.0037    -0.0202**    -0.0251** 
  (0.0206) (0.0024) (0.0100) (0.0124) 
     
Policy Effect 20.18% 0.91% 10.95% 12.42% 
     
HH Size 0.0017 0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0010 
  (0.0108) (0.0010) (0.0053) (0.0065) 
# of Children 0.0039 0.0004 -0.0019 -0.0024 
  (0.0128) (0.0012) (0.0062) (0.0077) 
Divorced    -0.0930** -0.0084    0.0452**    0.0562** 
 (0.0466) (0.0056) (0.0227) (0.0284) 
Never Married     0.0859*** 0.0077      -0.0418***     -0.0519*** 
 (0.0313) (0.0043) (0.0153) (0.0191) 
Other Income -0.0082 -0.0007 0.0040 0.0050 
 (0.0075 (0.0008) (0.0037) (0.0046) 
     
Observations 4,430 4,430 4,430 4,430 
     
     
Panel B: Other 
Health Usage    
 
 Used any Health Services last year Hospital In-Patient last year 
     
Post*Treat    -0.0542**    -0.0536** -0.0218 -0.0220 
 (0.0257) (0.0258) (0.0155) (0.0156) 
     
Policy Effect 13.53% 13.38% 38.45% 38.80% 
     
Other Income  -0.0096  0.0043 
  (0.0063)  (0.0038) 
     
Observations 4,430 4,430 4,430 4,430 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The models in Panel B include all other control variables listed in Panel 
A. Other income is a measure for household income that is created by subtracting the respondents’ income from the total income 
of the household. The estimate show the effect of an increase in other income by £1,000. Furthermore, region, year and month 
dummy variables are included in all models. Examples of health services asked for in the BHPS are usage of a physiotherapist, 
psychotherapist, health visitor at home and a hospital consultant. Pregnancies are excluded when examining changes in the 
likelihood of being a hospital in-patient. * p  < 0.10, ** p  < 0.05,  *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 8: Heterogeneous Effects of the Policy 
 Marginal Effects  
 Excellent Very Good Fair Poor/Very Poor 
N 
 
Panel A: Gender     
 
Male    .0990*** -0.0027    -0.0715***    -0.0247*** 3,310 
 (0.0338) (0.0069) (0.0244) (0.0082) 
 
Female     0.0051 0.0014 -0.0045 -0.0019 5,989 
 (0.0167) (0.0047) (0.0149) (0.0064)  
Panel B: Education      
A-levels or above  0.0481* 0.0074  -0.0392*  -0.0163* 3,841 
 (0.0262) (0.0054) (0.0215) (0.0090)  
O-levels or below 0.0117 0.0022 -0.0101 -0.0039 5,160 
 (0.0204) (0.0039) (0.0175) (0.0067)  
Panel C: Marital Status      
Married 0.0170 0.0033 -0.0145 -0.0059 5,420 
 (0.0201) (0.0040) (0.0171) (0.0069)  
Unmarried    0.0543** 0.0059    -0.0432**    -0.0169** 3,879 
 (0.0248) (0.0044) (0.0197) (0.0077)  
Panel D: Age      
Below 40    0.0525** -0.0005     -0.0378**    -0.0142** 4,902 
 (0.0241) (0.0029) (0.0173) (0.0066)  
At least 40 0.0091 0.0035 -0.0088 -0.0038 4,467 
 (0.0197) (0.0075) (0.0190) (0.0082)  
      
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by individuals, are shown in parentheses. The models include all other control variables 
listed in Table 5, including a measure for income of other members of the household.  Furthermore, region, year and month 
dummy variables are included in all models. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 9: The Effects of the Policy on Health Behavior and Leisure Expenditures: 
  
Current 
Smoker 
Drink at least 
once per 
Week 
Member of a 
Sports Club 
Spend > £80 
per Week on 
Leisure 
Family Vacation 
of at least one 
Week per Year 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Post*Treat    -0.0251** -0.0450   0.0392*     0.0338** 0.0349* 
  (0.0118) (0.0304) (0.0230) (0.0159) (0.0211) 
HH Size 0.0069 -0.0228 0.0057 0.0139 0.0054 
  (0.0073) (0.0339) (0.0132) (0.0105) (0.0137) 
# of Children -0.0006 -0.0258  -0.0313    -0.0223** -0.0042 
  (0.0130) (0.0342) (0.0227) (0.0130) (0.0208) 
Divorced    0.0620** -0.0800      0.1145*** -0.0543 -0.0338 
 (0.0218) (0.1520) (0.0366) (0.0426 (0.0745) 
Never Married     0.0088 0.1727 -0.0404 0.0408 -0.0575 
 (0.0231) (0.1535) (0.0590) (0.0452) (0.0610) 
Other Income -0.0032 -0.0098 0.0039 0.0104      0.0311*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0257) (0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0078) 
       
Observations 9,299 1,762 2,657 4,429 4,429 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Other income is a measure for household income that is created by 
subtracting the respondents’ income from the total income of the household. The estimate show the effect of an increase in other 
income by £1,000. Furthermore, region, year and month dummy variables are included in all models. Questions regarding 
participation in sport clubs are only available in the years 1997, 1999 and 2001, whereas questions about alcohol consumption are 
only asked in 1998 and 2000.  * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 10: The Effects of the Policy on Financial Stress: 
  
Current 
financial 
situation very 
difficult 
Better 
financial 
position than 1 
year ago 
Expect financial 
situation to 
worsen next year 
Satisfied with 
current job 
(overall) 
Satisfied with 
current job 
(pay) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Post*Treat    -0.0416** 0.0383 -0.0201 
               
0.0626**   0.0502** 
  (0.0198) (0.0283) (0.0176) (0.0290) (0.0246) 
HH Size 0.0174 0.0154 0.0039 -0.0168 -0.0071 
  (0.0174) (0.0191) (0.0101) (0.0184) (0.0168) 
# of Children 0.0315 -0.0112 -0.0400* -0.0114 0.0194 
  (0.0317) (0.0235) (0.0198) (0.0204) (0.0211) 
Divorced     0.2655*** -0.0588 -0.0135 -0.0112 0.0192 
 (0.0865) (0.1059) (0.0330) (0.0837) (0.0863) 
Never Married 0.0324 -0.0357 -0.0402 0.0531 0.0175 
 (0.0705) (0.0807) (0.0262) (0.0582) (0.0598) 
Other Income    -0.0259***      0.0378*** 0.0020 0.0217 0.0154 
 (0.0086) (0.0096) (0.0088) (0.0147) (0.0099) 
        
Observations 5,643 5,653 5,653 5,653 5,653 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Other income is a measure for household income that is created by 
subtracting the respondents’ income from the total income of the household. The estimate show the effect of an increase in other 
income by £1,000. Furthermore, region, year and month dummy variables are included in all models. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
***p<0.01. 
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Table 11: Robustness Checks 
 Marginal Effects  
 Excellent Very Good Fair 
Poor/Very 
Poor 
N 
Panel A: Alternative 
Treatment Cutoffs Treat = 1.10 x NMW 
 
Post*Treat    0.0293**  -0.0031*    -0.0234**    -0.0090** 15,336 
 (0.0125) (0.0016) (0.0100) (0.0038) 
 
 Treat = 1.20 x NMW  
Post*Treat    0.0207** -0.0021   -0.0165*   -0.0063* 15,385 
 (0.0115) (0.0013) (0.0091) (0.0040)  
 Treat = 1.30 x NMW  
Post*Treat    0.0235** -0.0024*    -0.0187**    -0.0072** 15,455 
 (0.0108) (0.0013) (0.0086) (0.0033)  
      
Panel B: Placebo Tests Temporal Placebo: Treatment: 4/1/1998  
Post*Treat 0.0230 -0.0037 -0.0190 -0.0077 9.299 
 (0.0149) (0.0026) (0.0123) (0.0050)  
 Placebo Treatment: Treat: 2-3 x NMW; Control: >3 x NMW  
Post*Treat -0.0201 -0.0039 0.0120 0.0041 13,552 
 (0.0132) (0.0027) (0.0079) (0.0027)  
     
 
Panel C: Alternative 
Model Treatment Group: Report Wage Increase in 1999 
 
Post*Treat    0.0588***    0.0178***   -0.0551***    -0.0215*** 3,486 
 (0.0175) (0.0069) (0.0165) (0.0067)  
      
Panel D: Salary 
Workers Control Group: Financially Unaffected Salary Workers 
 
Post*Treat 0.0374** -0.0020 -0.0270** -0.0084** 8,925 
 (0.0177) (0.0016) (0.0128) (0.0040)  
      
Panel E: 
Semiparametric DD 
Excellent/Very 
Good Health 
Poor/Very 
Poor Health 
Fin. Situation 
improved 
Current 
Smoker 
 
DD Effect    0.0290***    0.0314***  0.0363** -0.0064 9,299 
 (0.0114) (0.0081) (0.0154) (0.0068)  
      
Panel F: Parallel 
Trends Test     
 
DD Effect    0.0610*** -0.0144 0.0473* -0.0212 9,299 
 (0.0197) (0.0123) (0.0259) (0.0171)  
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by individuals, are shown in parentheses. The standard errors for the semi-parametric 
DD estimates are obtained through bootstrapping using 99 replications All models include all the control variables listed in 
Tables 5, 6, and 7. Furthermore, region, year and month dummy variables are included in all models. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p 
< 0.01. 
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Table 12: The Role of Supplemental Private Insurance 
  
Panel A: Private 
Coverage 
Panel B: Health Status 
Excellent Very Good Fair 
Poor/Very 
Poor 
      
Post*Treat -0.0305 0.0405*** 0.0081** -0.0338*** -0.0148*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0155) (0.0036) (0.0129) (0.0057) 
      
Private Coverage  0.0096 0.0019 -0.008 -0.0035 
  (0.0205) (0.0041) (0.0171) (0.0075) 
      
N 7,280 7,280 7,280 7,280 7,280 
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by individuals, are shown in parentheses. All models include all the control variables 
listed in Tables 5, 6, and 7.The excluded category for private coverage estimate in Panel B is not having private coverage. 
Furthermore, region, year and month dummy variables are included in all models. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
